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CHARLES MASON—IOWA'S FIRST JURIST. •
BY HON. EMLIN M ' C L A I N .
An interest, almost as romantic as that which attaches fo
the discoverer or the pathfinder, surrounds the pioneer law
makers of a new community. They introduce into the wilder-
ness the essential element of civilization—order in civil
affairs. The law maker considers the circumstances and the
needs of the people who are associating themselves together
under new surroundings to build up a state, and aims to pro-
vide for their present and future civic welfare. The judge
attem pts, while administering justice between litigants, to mold
the system of law which he finds at hand so that it shall be
suited to and keep pace with the anticipated growth of the
institutions under which the people are to live. Each is con-
scious of a freedom and responsibility in determining what
shall be the tendency of the course of development which
can be enjoyed to but a slight degree by those who follow
him.
The constitution maker, the legislator, the codifier in a
new state, each has some of the opportunities for indulging
in philosophical considerations as to the functions of govern-
ment and the proper relations of the subject to the state
which furnished such intellectual delight to Plato, Locke and
Bentham, coupled, however, with the responsibility for keep-
ing his theorizing within the bounds of practicable administra-
tion which those theorists lacked in, their abstract specula-
tions. That which has become obsolete in the systems of
law which serve for models cail be pi'uned away and
plainly desirable reforms can be introduced, without the con-
troversy involved in changing an established order of
things. It is easy at the beginning to abolish the peculiari-
ties of sealed instruments; to wipe out absurd fictions as to
the status of married women; to eliminate the complicated,
rules of evidence depending upon the technical doctrine that
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a party cannot be a witness; and to bring the rules of plead-
ing which have been perpetuated from a time when functions
of court and jury were very different,- into harmony with the
present methods of trying cases; So the judge can refuse to
follow precedents which have become objectionable, ancl set
up new guide-posts. Thus it was that 'the Supreme Court
of the Territory of Iowa could hold a note under seal to be a
negotiable instrument and the 'Supreme Court of the State
could find that cattle running at large were "free common-
ers," the uniform rule of the common law in this respect to
the contrary notwithstanding, i The credit for ability ancl
originality still given in many of the states to the early
courts as compared with the courts of a later day in the same
states is largely due, no doubt, tp the opportunities they had,
rather than to the inferiority .ofj the later judges; neverthe-
less, the early judges who could rise superior to the difficul-
ties with which they were necessarily surrounded when able
lawyers were few and law libraries were limited, could appre-
jciate the necessities of a rapidly developing ' country and
could foresee the outcome of | problematical changes, are
justly entitled to the greatest praise.
Judge Mason, as the Chief Justice and most influential
member of the Supreme Court for the Territorj' of Iowa, and
.as the draughtsman of the first code for the new State, is en-
titled to the great distinction of having done the most nota-
ble and satisfactory work in both of tliese fields. The object
of this paper is to point out sonie of the particulars in which
the excellence of his work is shown ancl thus help in forming
a just estimate of his character and ability as a jurist.
Charles Mason's education and training were not such as
to specially prepare him for the technical work of a judge.
If he succeeded in that work,' it was rather by reason of
natural qualities of mind than special attainments, either as
a student or a practitioner. Perhaps the requirements for a
position on the bench of the new Territory were not so exact-
ing as those of a similar position during a later period in the
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history of the State; but as will appear when the work he
did is noted hereafter in detail, he dealt successfully with
technical questions of procedure . as well as with general
principles of law.
Entering West Point as a cadet in 1825, when nearly
twenty-one years of age, he graduated in 1829 at the head
oi his class, Kobert E. Lee and Joe Johnsfei, both subse^f "t
quently noted confederate generals, being rnembers of the
.same class, and on graduation he was assigned to the en-
gineering corps. He served for the two years following as
assistant professor of engineering at West Point and then
resigned from the army. ' It should be said in connection
with this reference to his military experience that at the be-
ginning of the War of the Rebellion Judge Mason tendered
his services to the Governor of Iowa in connection with the
raising of troops for the defense of the Union, but for some
reason—perhajjs because younger and more ambitious men
were pressing for recognition—he was not given an oppor-
tunity to turn his military training to account in tbe service
of the country; and beyond acting as one of the commis-
sioners appointed in 1861 by the Legislature to control a
State war fund, he had no part in the military history of the
State. He was in politics a Democrat, but his opinion in
the first case decided by the Territorial Supreme Court in
which it was held that' there could not be slave property in
Iowa (the case of Ralph, hereafter referred to) would indi-
cate that he was not a sympathizer with the pro-slavery atti-
tude of his party.
Mason had studied law while a professor at West Point,
and after resigning from the army he practiced at Newburg,
New York, for two years, and then for two years in New York
City. Here he was a contributor to the Evening Post under
William CuUen Bryant, and for a year or more he was man-
aging editor of that paper while Bryant was absent in
Europe. Then he came to Burlington, served a year as dis-
trict attorney while Des Moines county was still a part of
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Wisconsin, and was appointed by the President in 1838 as.
Chief Justice of the Suprem'e i Court of the newly formed
Territory of Iowa. This position he held for nine years, and
until .the creation of a State Snpreme Conrt on the admission
of Iowa to the Union. Imrnediately after leaving the-
supreme bench he was selected by the Legislature to act as
one of three commissioners to prepare a code for the State,
which was adopted in 1851. The thirteen years of his life,
therefore, from the' time he was thirty-four years of age,,
cover the period of his activity as a public jurist and it is to-
this period that the present paper relates. It is enough to-
say of his subsequent life that for the following fonr years-
he was united States Commissioner of Patents, and from the
expiration of this term of service until his death in 1882 he
was actively engaged in the mahagement of various and im-
portant financial enterprises at Burlington.
In relation to the work of the Territorial Supreme Court
as a whole, the significant thing seems to be that there was.
so little of it. At the first term, Jnly, 1839, bnt one case
was decided, so far as reported, and though that case was one-
of great public importance thé réport of it, arguments in-
cluded, occupies but seven pages. At the December term,
ten cases are reported as decided, and in all of tbese Judge-
Mason wrote the opinions. Qf the following July term,,
twenty-one cases are reported, i.n all of which, save four, and
these of small importance. Mason wrote the opinions. In-
deed, in the whole seven years of its existence the court de-
cided only one hnndred and riinety-one cases, and in only
twenty-five of these were opinions written by either of the-
other two jndges. Chief Justice Mason must have been
largely predominant not only in the labors but in the judg-
• ments of the tribunal.
It Will be interesting now to notice some of the questions-
- which came before this court, and how Judge Mason dealt
with them. The first one involved the interesting qnestion
' of the status of a slave Under the laws of the territoi-y..
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Kalph, a colored man and formerly a slave in Missouri, had
been allowed to ¡gonie to Iowa under a contract to pay a stip-
ulated sum for his own freedom, but this sum not being paid
within the time agreed upon, the former master commenced
proceedings to recover possession of him, and Ralph was de-
livered by the sheriff of Dubuque county to the master for
transportation to Missouri. The colored man took legal steps
for release, it being claimed for him that by the terms of the
Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Ter-
ritory, which ordinance had been extended over Iowa, and
by Congressional legislation, slavery was prohibited in the
Territory; and further that the master, by permitting the
:slave to come into Iowa where slavery was not recognized,
virtually manumitted him and could not afterwards recover
him as a fugitive under the so-called fugitive slave law. On
the other side it was contended that the congressional decla-
ration of 1820, known as the Missouri Compromise, which
prohibited slavery in the territories north of latitude thirty-
:six degrees and thirty minutes was not intended to operate
without further legislation, and that even if it was intended to
•.so operate it was not effectual to work a forfeiture of previously
existing property in slaves. In the opinion Judge Mason
declares that the Missouri Compromise was intended of its
own effect to terminate slavery in the territory described, and
that, when the slave was allowed to become a resident of
Iowa, property in him ceased to exist. The opinion contains
no elaborate or ostentatious declaration of general principles ;
but.the questious in controversy are clearly stated, and the
validity of the Missouri Compromise as, a prohibition of slav-
ery in the free territories is fully annpunced. The conclus-
ion of the court iu the, whole matter is thus tersely stated:
"When the slave-owner" seeking to retain the custody and
control of. his slave "illegally restrains a human being of his
liberty, it is proper that the laws,,M'hich should extend equal,
protection to men of all colors and conditions, should exert
their remedialinterposition." It is to be remembered that Chief
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Justice Taney and a majority of|i his associates on the bench
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the famous-
Dred Scott case subsequently declared the Missouri Com-
promise invalid and denied any ¡legal status in the free ter-
ritories to one who had been a'j slave. The correctness of'
this conclusion of the federal court as a principle for the
guidance of the administrative branch of the government was
one of the burning issues of tlie -presidential campaign of
1860, and as a result of the election of President Lincoln the-
entire theory of the majority of the court was overthrown and.
cast aside. The former slaves! were treated as men with
rights, in accordance with the views of Judge Mason, and.
not as the mere chattels which Chief Justice Taney had de-
clared them to be. ' |i
In an action on a promissory,; note under seal *it was held,
without discussion of authoritiesjlthat the affixing of a seal to
such an instrument did not prevent its being made a nego-
tiable instrument under the terins of the laws of Michigan
on the subject, and that a subsequent statute of the Territory
of Iowa allowing fraud to be pleaded as a defense to a nego-
tiable note did not apply to a note already executed before
the statute was passed, even though the note was under seal..
This conclusion is based on the Slanguage of the Ordinance
of 1787 which declares in general terms that "no law ought
ever to be made or have force in|the said Territory that shall
in any manner interfere with, or affect private contracts or
engagements, bonafide and without fraud, previously form-
ed;" and incidentally the prohibition in the federal consti-
tution against the inipairing the I obligation of contracts was-
referred to. It was found that tlie suit by the holder, though
he took the note before the passage of the Iowa statute, was,,
however, brought in the name ofjthe payee, and therefore on
the authority of a Delaware case ¡it was decided that the de-
fense of fraud might be pleaded.'
*Temple v. Hays & Hendersbott, Morris, p. 9.
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In another case*, the fundamental principle, so often au-
nouncecl in later decisions, that the Supreme Court, having
no power to try an issue of fact before a jury or send it to a
district court for such trial, could not interfere with the ver-
dict of the jury in the lower court on the facts, was laid
clown. Another principle, often since recognized, was
announced, that a strong case must be made out to authorize
the Supreme Court to interfere with the exercise of discre-
tion by the lower conrt in refusing to grant a new trial.,
In a suit against the Commissioners of Dubuque County-j-
the court had to deal with a county seat election contest
and discussed elaborately the want of power on the part of
the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus ancl other
such writs not pertaining to the exercise by that court of its
appellate powers.
Another case involved;}: a question of great moment in the
yonng commonwealth. By act of Congress it had been provid-
ed in 1807 that settlers on public lands without right previously
acquired from or recognized by the United States should be
subject to the penalty of a forfeiture of all rights in such land
and removal by the marshal. When the Territory of Iowa was
organized, there were within its limits over twenty-five thous-
and people who lived on pnblic land, none of them; except
the few who had title in portions of the so-called Half-breed
Tract, having any title or right recognized by the federal
government to the lands on which they lived. The claims of
tliese squatters to the occupancy of and improvements on their
respective tracts were treated, however, among themselves as
subject of sale ancl purchase, and the question was whether
such transactions were of any validity. The court concerned
itself very greatly (and very properly) with the effect upon
the welfare of the people which would result from holding such
transactions illegal, and it sought for and found a theory
•Brazolton v. Jenkins. Morris, p. 1.1.
tUnitod iitates ox rol. Davonport v. Commissionors of DubuQue County, Morris,
p. «1.
ilUil V. Smith, Morris, p. 70. ' ' •
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iipon which they could be. sustained as lawful. It is said
that Congress could never have intended "to disturb the
peaceable and industrious husbaiidman whose labor was ad-
ding so much to the public wealth, changing the barren
wilderness into fertile fields, andi calling into almost mao-ic
existence whole states and territories, whose prosperity and
power are constantly adding so much to the strength and
glory of the nation." The whole opinion is an example of
the ingenuity which a court may properly resort to in order
that justice and not injustice shall result from the adminis-
tration of the law. - .
In another case *this question was considered, whether
aside from special authority in some statute a partnersliip
could sue in its firm name. The court deliberately and avow-
edly disregarded the precedents o^  common law practice and
held that such a method of bringing suit was allowable, and
established that as the rule for Iowa.
, Indeed this liberal spirit in thp interpretation of the law
is fully exemplified in many of these decisions. Without
further citation of particular cases'; it will be sufficient to no-
tice a few examples. In condemning the attempt to defeat
a criminal prosecution on a mere technicality the Chief Jus-
tice, speaking in the first person, declares that "I would give
the accused every reasonable opportunity to enable him to
vindicate his innocence, be liberally indulgent to his objec-
tions, to whatever might have a tendency to convict him un-
justly, but never, unless from necessity, open an aperture
through which guilt and innocence may alike escape with
impunity." And he continues: "I know a somewhat differ-
ent rule was early adopijed in the English courts and has been
followed with rather a blind acquiescence in most of the States
of the Union. The rule originated when the laws of England
were written in blood, and was the result of the humanity
of her judiciary, struggling to weaken or evade the san-
— — . . i - •
•Johnson & Co. v. Smith, Morris p. 105.
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.guinary edicts of tyrants. The judges had no power to annul
•or even to mitigate the law which affixed death as the pen-
alty for many of the minor, offences, but they could and did
give the accused the benefit of delay, and even of ultimate
•escape, by sustaining objections to indictments for formal
and trivial defects. If they could not modify the severity of
punishments too severe, humanity prompted them to diaiin-
ish their certainty. With ns the case is very different. Fol-
lowing the dictates of humanity and sound policy, we have
.gone far to revolutionize the penal code of our ancestors.
Our legislators recognize the maxim that certainty of pun-
ishment is better than severity. Under these cirumstances
it seems to me the courts should do all they justly can to
render punishment the inevitable consequence of transgres-
sion. Instead of blindly adopting rules dictated by human-
ity, under circumstances so'totally different, we should apply
the principles of reason to our own laws and present situa-
tion."
In the same strain of respect for common sense in the
administration of the law and regard for reasons that shall
appeal to all, the following language is used in another case
where a convicted criminal sought to escape punishment be-
cause of aii alleged want of technical verbiage in an indict-
ment: "This perhaps may be thought a deviation from the
•ordinary current of judicial argument, but if it be^ so we think
it a deviation on the side of reason. Courts should accom-
modate their decisions, so far as is compatible with justice,
to the common sense of mankind, if they would secure for
the law its ablest guardian^—public respect. There is some
reason to apprehend that criminal justice has been already
in some instances so disguised by technical refinements and
subtleties, as to become a subject of ridicule to men whose
minds are unbiased by their peculiar education or interests.
'This feeling ought not to be increased by increasing the.
•cause, but on the contrary, where the current of authority is
Jiot. too strong, we should seize all occasions to bring back
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the, rules of decision to such a standard as the • common
reason of mankind may sanction and approve."
In regard to the weight to be given to precedent this
forcible language is used under similar circumstances:
"Where authorities are thus discordant, we should resort to-
principle by which to guide our -decision. In fact it seems
to me that reason should in such cases be appealed to in the
first instance, relying upon authority to direct us only where
our natural guide becomes incompetent. To bow blindly to-
any decisions, however respectable, is to subject ourselves to-
the risk of misapplying those decisions, of improperly engraft-
ing them upon statutes different [from those to which they
naturally apply, and at all events of keeping alive abuses and
absurdities which such a course I will inevitably create and
perpetuate in any branch of science. Frequently, at all
events, we should, in nautical langluage, 'take an observation'
to determine by the fixed and unvarying lights above whether
some uncalculated current of authorities is not drifting us-
from the great object we are endeavoring to reach—the ad-
ministration of justice. This is niore particularly important
when we are founding a judicial system for an independent
community. The decisions of other courts should be treated
with high respect, but^  they should be regarded in the light
of wise counsellors rather than that of arbitrary sovereigns."^
All the opinions above referred to or quoted from are by
Chief Justice Mason. -They illustrate the homely good
sense and sound legal discretion constantly made use of by
him in administering the law. They show that he wielded a
trenchant pen and was capable of stating his views with such
terseness and clearness as to leave no doubt as to his conclu-
sions or the soundness of the reasoning on which they were-
based. In construing a statute he says of the legislators-
that in "lugging in" a cortain provision "by the head and
shoulders they have spoken so as not to be misunderstood."
And on his part he never exhibited any hesitation in taking
the bull bv the horns when a difficultv was to be handled.
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It is not extravagant to say that in the vigorous manner of
so treating legal difficulties as to reach sound results Chief
Justice Mason is to be likened to Chief Justice Marshall of
the United States Supreme Court. Each came to his posi-
tion without great reputation as a jurist; each had succes-
sors who surpassed him in technical knowledge; but nei-
ther was ever surpassed on the bench which he graced, as a
great expounder of the law in its formative condition when
reason rather than authority must furnish the best guide to-
wise conclusions.
Distinguished as were the services of Judge Mason on
the bench, his most marked infiuence on the laws of the-
State was exercised in drafting the first code of the State,
the so-called Code of 1851. The Revised Statutes of the
Territory, published in 1843, compiled by a joint committee
of the Legislature and arranged by the Secretary of the Ter-
ritory, was a mere aggregation of existing statutes, under
general headings selected with more or less discretion,as the-
case might be, and arranged in alphabetical order. The re-
sults of this plan were in some instances truly wonderful.
You find for example edifying chapters on Abatement,.
Agent, Auctioneer, Acts Amended, Blacks and Mulattoes,
Chancery, Dogs, Right, Gaming, Immoral Practices, Gro-
cery License, Laws, Prairies, Right, Stallions and Jacks,.
Wolves, and Worshipping Congregations; and you marvel
at the high regard for consistency and convenience which
seems to have dominated the minds of the compilers in se-
lecting the titles and thus determining the order of the con-
tents. It must have required the concurrent wisdom of
master minds to collect provisions as to commissioners to sell
county lands, a superintendent of public buildings at Iowa
City, and commissioners to sell town lots in Iowa City, all
under the head of Agenits; to arrange in another chapter
designated as Acts Amended, various provisions relating to-
taking up strays, fixing terms of court, regulating criminal
procedure, and sales under execution; to place provisions re-
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lating to the offense, of swearing within the hearing of a
religious assemblage in the chapter on Immoral Practices
and those as to the disturbance of a religious meeting by pro-
fane swearing, vulgar language or immoral conduct in a
chapter on Worshipping Congregations in a distant part of
the volume; to bring, together two different codes for the
government of the militia, one of whicli wholly superceded
the other ; to treat Bills of Exchange in one ' place and
Promissory Notes in another; to treat the Action of Right
as a substitute for ejectment and! again among the R's; to
insert in the chapter headed Repeal, and regulating the
effect of the repeal of a statute, a section repealing "An net
respecting seals" ; to collect statutes as to Roads in one place
and insert elsewhere as the sole topic under Supervisors a
section as to penalties for refusing to work on the roads,
while provisions as to Road Tax were placed in a chapter be-
tween Trespassing Animals and ¡Townships; and to treat
Boats and. Vessels in one chapter and Watercrafts, Lost
Ooods and Estrays in another. j
By an act of the First General Assembly of the State
convened in January, 1848, in extra session, a commission
was appointed consisting of "Charles Mason, Des Moines
County, William G. Woodward, 'i Muscatine County, and
Stephen Hempstead, Dubuque County" "to draft, revise and
prepare a code of laws for the State of Iowa." The commis-
sioners were.directed to "prepare a complete and perfect
code of laws, as nearly as may be, of a general nature only,
and furnish a complete index to the same when completed."
The task thus set before the commissioners was certainly one
of great magnitude for even an infant commonwealth, and it
was discharged "as nearly as migHt be" by .the preparation
of a code of three thousand, three ¡hundred and sixty-seven'
sections, covering as printed fourl hundred and sixty-nine
pages of ordinary law-book size, which was reported to the
Legislature in 1851 and adopted as the Code of Iowa.
, Although Mr,. Woodward was charged with the duty of,
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superintending the publication of the Code and the prepara-
tion of marginal notes and index, it is nevertheless generally
understood that Judge Mason, who was the chairman of the
Commission, did the principal part of the work of compila-
tion, and the quality of the performance is such as to refiect
great credit upon the author. Indeed, the person who wrote'
the Code of 1851 is to be spoken of in that connection as an
author, rather than a compiler; for while he had before him
the volume of compiled laws already described, and several
volumes of session laws of succeeding Territorial and State
legislatures, he managed to condense and re-write the matter
in such a masterly style that while preserving the essence of
the statutory law as it had already been enacted, he gave it
a form entirely ditferent from that of the verbose and stilted
statutes in which it had originally been embodied.
The notion that a statute will be defective and inadequate
unless full of repetition, reduplication and tautology, seems
to have obtained a strong foothold in the popular mind, yet
experience shows that language which is simple and direct,
and which states one thought but once and in as few words
as possible, is least likely to cause confusion when it comes
to be construed. This was certainly Judge Mason's idea,
for the Code of 1851 is a model of plain and unambiguous
statement, in direct and clear language, of the rules and legal
propositions which are attempted to be laid down. So satis-
factory, has been the work done, that while these sections
have been overlaid with subsequent legislation, they have
been largely retained in the Revision of 1860, the Code of
1873 and the Code of 1897, as the best statement of that
portion of the law which they were intended to cover.
But Judge Mason did not confine himself to a mere con-
densation of the existing statutory law. Legal reform was
in the air, and during the year in which the first Code Com-
mission of Iowa was appointed, the New York commissioners,
led by the great statutory law reformer, David Dudley Field,
had reported the first New York codes. The codes prepared
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by Mr. Field were not fully accepted by the New York
legislature, .either then or subsequently, but many of his
•cherished reforms were incorporated into the written law,
and the code of procedure was fully adopted. It was but
natural that Judge Mason should feel the influence of this
movement, which, commencing in New York, rapidly ex-
tended westward and radically affected the legislation of all
the newer states, culminating eventually in California, where
the Field codes so-called were substantially adopted in a
body. In Iowa the movement for complete codification of
the law never got beyond the dode of procedure and the
criminal code. No attempt was made either by Judge
Mason or succeeding codifiers to embody any considerable
part of the general principles, of the law in statutory
form. It is doubtful if such ail attempt would have been
wise. As a matter of fact the difficulties of applying
the terms of a statute are found to be quite "as great as
those in applying the general rules of the unwritten law.
But the reform movement did'result elsewhere and also
in Iowa in remedying some of the most striking defects of
the system of law derived by the American colonies from
England, and those reforms were introduced by Judge Mason
in the Code of 1851. • ;
It must not be assumed that the Code of 1851 was a copy
•of, or substantially derived from, any code found in any
state. The general principles oí law reform as they liad
been discussed in New York and elsewhere were recognized,
but the result was thé production of the Iowa author, and
not a mere adaptation of the work of another.
One of the notable results of giving to the work of codi-
fication an intelligent interest and judgment, and of keeping
touch with similar undertakings elsewhere, was the abandon-
ment of the alphabetical arrangement of subjects which had
been followed in thé Revised Statutes of 1843, and is still
followed in compiling the laws of some of the states, and an
introduction in its stead of a classification based on an intel-
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ligent analysis of the subject matter of the law. This
arrangement has been preserved in subsequent codes, and we
have the general division into four parts—public law, private
law, civil procedure'and criminal law. The classification may
not be scientifically accurate, ,but it is practical and conven-
ient as compared with the old alphabetical plan.
To sum up as a whole Judge Mason's services to the-State
as a codifier, it is enough to say that he introduced the
scientific arrangement of the subject-matter, executed the
work in a skillful and scholarly manner, set a precedent for
the embodiment of statutory enactments in plain, direct and
intelligible Euglish, aud furnished the model which has been
followed in-subsequent State codes.
TEBRITOEIAL EXTENSION OF IOWA.—The General Assem-
bly of this State has memorialized Congress for an extension
of territory on the northwest boundary. Our present west-
ern boundary from the junction of the Big Sioux river with
the Missouri, is defined by the course of the former, up to
latitude 43 deg. 30 min. The design of the memorialists is
to take up the northern boundary line from this latter point
to the Big Sioux river, and continue it upon that parallel
uutil it intersects the Missouri river. The projection of this
line would strike that river about 200 miles above the mouth
of the Big Sioux, nearly opposite the Mankisitah, or White
Earth river, which runs nearly a due east course, and heads
directly on a line with the South Pass of the Rocky Moun-
tains, about one degree of latitude north of Fort Laramie.
This is a large tract of territory, -portions of it exceedingly
rich and valuable, and is well watered by the Vermillion, or
Wadshesha river, the James river, and its tributaries, five
considerable streams, dignified with the name of rivers, the
Wanauri river, the Nawii, and several smaller streams.—
Quasqueton (loica) Guardian, February 28, 1857.

